

Election Integrity Manual

8 September 2022

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This manual is a work in progress, and will be updated whenever new or additional information is available. If you have any comments, suggestions, or corrections, please send those to: director@ga.foramericafirst.com

July 2022. This manual was developed and published by Georgia for America First, with resources provided by The American Project. Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information provided in this manual, but given the variance in procedures by locality, and many recent legal and procedural changes, errors and omissions are inevitable; therefore, only the Code of Georgia and official procedures are authoritative.

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Introduction

Elections in Georgia are a disgrace. The primary objective of election administration should be the conduct of elections that encourage confidence in the fairness and legitimacy of the process; yet Georgia's elections are among the least trusted in the nation, and recent "reforms" have only exacerbated our problems.

In 2020, in response to COVID, we saw the introduction of changes in election procedures that universally weakened the security and integrity of the election process. With a huge expansion in early voting came inadequate security measures for absentee ballots and inadequate "chain of custody" processes and oversight for the seemingly ubiquitous drop boxes. Georgia was also plagued with an inaccurate voter list bloated with many fraudulent registrations; a gaping security hole potentially facilitating many types of election fraud.

Confidence that elections are fair, and that the results accurately reflect the will of the people, is foundational for a functional democracy. Unfortunately, Georgia has adopted machine-based voting, counting, and registration processes that decrease public confidence in elections. Machine-based processes are not transparent or even comprehensible for ordinary citizens and poll workers; and computer experts are prevented from understanding the internal workings of these machines because foolish state officials signed contracts protecting the "intellectual property" of machine manufacturers.

It is not just the machines that are non-transparent. In 2020 and more recent elections, we witnessed an appalling lack of transparency in both polling and counting processes; with poll watchers being physically prevented from observing in some cases, and counting processes conducted in secret, without any observers. We also have allegations of counterfeit ballots being counted, and video evidence of ballot box stuffing in the dead of night.

It's as if we were watching elections in some under-developed third world country, but the sad truth is our elections may be even worse than those. Statistical analysis is an effective tool used in international election monitoring to identify fraud in elections, and when those same tools are applied in Georgia, we see unexplainable spikes in returns and statistically impossible results.

Like a banana republic, we have politicized institutions and a breakdown in rule of law; with evidence of potential crimes like double-voting, shredding ballots, counterfeit ballots, and ballot box stuffing; not investigated or adjudicated by law enforcement agencies, courts (including the state Supreme Court), or the Governor's office. We also have state-sponsored suppression of whistleblowers, with Fulton County firing an election official who had the temerity (and courage) to report election fraud.

Ineffective Election Reforms

The Election Integrity Act of 2021 was supposed to address some of the most obvious flaws in our election processes, but how effective will it really be? It prevents election superintendents or boards of registrars from accepting private funding (or bribes) from billionaires to change to less secure voting processes and spur turnout in targeted districts; but it is ludicrous is it that this was

ever allowed in the first place; and once the scheme was revealed it became politically untenable to continue, so they didn't give up much there.

Oddly, the new law allows optional Sunday voting days, enabling potentially partisan election officials to add more voting days in favored communities, and fewer for the less-favored. This is an unequal application of law, as the time and manner of voting should be consistent for all citizens.

The new law creates a voter intimidation and illegal election activities hotline, but this is an ineffective remedy because it leaves the decision as to whether to follow up on the complaint with the Attorney General, who has already demonstrated an unwillingness to investigate election crimes.

The act allows early processing and scanning of absentee ballots to promote voter confidence by ensuring results are reported quickly; but early counting of ballots will just provide more opportunity for cheating, and thus will actually *decrease* voter confidence. Speed of counting does not increase confidence; only transparency can do that.

When an absentee ballot is rejected as unreadable by a tabulating machine, it is reviewed by election officials for voter intent, and if they decide the voter wanted to vote for a particular candidate, they copy their interpretation onto a clean ballot, and feed that through the tabulator. The percentage of absentee ballots rejected increased dramatically from 2016 through 2020, so the Election Integrity Act establishes "duplication panels" to speed up this process. Actually, the number rejected increased because of intentional changes in the software of the machines, and the fact that potentially partisan poll workers are increasingly determining voter "intent" out of sight of the individuals that cast those ballots damages confidence in the election process.

Interestingly, the Act states that: protecting electors from improper interference, political pressure, or intimidation while waiting in line to vote is of paramount importance to protecting the election system and ensuring voter confidence. This is true, but while protecting voters who vote in person on election day, the Act does nothing to protect absentee ballots. Absentee voting has always been less secure than voting in person, and one reason it was limited in the past was precisely to protect voters from the "improper interference, political pressure, or intimidation," they might experience in the home, or in a care facility.

This is a long list of problems associated with current election reform efforts. Ironically, Section 37 of the Election Integrity Act describes a transparent manual voting process for primaries which, if adopted for general elections, would solve many of the concerns associated with a lack of transparency in machine voting, and would go a long way towards restoring voter confidence in the integrity of elections.

Angie Allison State Director Georgia for Election Transparency

Operation Eagles Wings

Georgia for Election Transparency and Georgia for America First are part of a national initiative called "Operation Eagles Wings" supported by the America Project (TAP), and through the voluntary contributions of individuals committed to the restoration and strengthening of constitutional democracy in America. OEW grew out of a program developed for the 2021 state and local elections in Virginia, creating a template for issue advocacy and election integrity programing which became known as the "Virginia Model". ¹

Virginians for America First (VFAF) launched on 09 March 2021 with the intent to achieve which aimed to elect an America First majority in the Virginia House of Delegates. Bishop Leon Benjamin, initially supported by Americans for Limited Government (ALG), led the efforts as the founder of Virginians for America First. His courageous stand on America First principles resonated with Virginians of all races and social standing. He was instrumental in bringing unity, building coalitions, and reaching into communities not normally engaged.

Once VFAF launched there was great response with hundreds of sign-ups within hours. This came as a surprise. The *overwhelming* interest of those sign-ups was *election integrity* (EI). It became obvious we must include an EI program component to satisfy the interests of our volunteers.

While I was a political appointee during the Trump Administration at the US Agency for International Development, I had worked with Tim Meisburger, who was appointed to USAID by President Trump in 2017 as a director of USAID's Center for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG).

Tim is an expert in EI, with 30+ years experience around the globe working to ensure free and fair elections in third world and developing democracies; so I contacted him, and asked for his help in developing an EI program based on accepted international standards. Tim joined VFAF/ALG and developed the EI program. He generated a manual for election observation specific to Virginia based on recognized international standards.

The EI program in conjunction with the America First voter education component became the complete "Virginia Model." Parts of this model are being shared in states across the nation by others, but only TAP is providing the model in total.

In the summer of 2021 TAP learned of VFAF's project in Virginia, and began supporting it financially as the major contributor. TAP recognized early on that this project was making an impact in Virginia, and that what had been effective in Virginia in 2021 could serve as a model for programs in battleground states in 2022.

The EI component of OEW consists of four major parts:

Voter education of America First issues concentrating on low-propensity voters. These
are voters who are generally not politically engaged but want America First principles in
our government.

¹ See Fixing Virginia's Elections to Save America

- Training of poll workers/poll watchers with an in-depth program on election observation, reporting, and the rights of citizens to have free and fair elections.
- Direct citizen observation and review of processes and procedures pertaining to the maintenance of and handling of voter rolls. This is primarily achieved by communicating directly with election officials in each municipality.
- Real time evaluation of absentee ballot processing during election season (45 days of early voting in Virginia). This part of the program will need to be adjusted to correspond with state specific statutes.

The voter education component of the OEW conducts campaigns to inform voters who have historically had little access to information on the America First movement about the of how America First policies can increase their freedom and improve their lives. Increased turnout by new America First voters, particularly in minority communities, was a very important part of the victory in Virginia. We learned through our targeted voter education efforts, and canvassing, that addressing issues that directly affected voters and their families made the difference in turning out minorities to support candidates who embraced America First principles.

Following its successes in Virginia, TAP developed the "Operation Eagles Wings" program to share its approaches with like-minded organizations across the country, and to implement the Virginia Model Template in nine critical states: Florida, Georgia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Wisconsin, Arizona, Texas, and Illinois.

2021 in Virginia was a message sent to every America First Patriot that with dedicated hard work, focus, and a united effort "We the People" can save the Republic for future generations. 2022 offers us the opportunity to repeat a Virginia type victory all around the nation. Join us by going to www.americaproject.com to volunteer for, and donate to this effort.

Mark Lloyd Director Operation Eagles Wings

1 Advocacy for Election Reform in Georgia

To restore confidence in the integrity of Georgia's elections will require fundamental reform of election laws and procedures to increase the transparency and security of the entire process. Volunteers should be advocates in their communities and across the state for these simple, commonsense reforms.

1.1 Commonsense Election Reforms

End most early and mail-in voting; Supposedly to make it easier to vote, our election day has expanded to six weeks, but election professionals agree that early voting, mail-in voting, drop boxes and ballot harvesting all facilitate voter intimidation, impersonation, ballot box stuffing and other forms of fraud. To protect Georgia's elections and restore confidence in their integrity, we must demand that lawmakers return to a single election day. Rather than extending the voting period or using insecure mail-in ballots to increase participation at the expense of election integrity, they may make election day a mandated holiday with absentee voting limited to those with a genuine and provable need.

<u>Demand clean voter rolls</u>; Bloated and inaccurate voter rolls facilitate all forms of vote fraud. Require the Georgia Secretary of State to conduct a comprehensive voter list audit using internationally accepted standards and practices, and then address the weaknesses in our voter registration process identified through the audit.

<u>Use manual rather than machine-based voting and counting processes</u>; Voting and counting machines are inherently non-transparent, prone to malfunction, and are viewed by many computer experts (and by senior politicians of both parties) as highly susceptible to rigging, fraud and abuse. Machine processes cannot be effectively observed and certified by election officials, observers, or ordinary citizens, and as such they have no place in Georgia's elections. To restore confidence in the integrity of elections, Georgia must revert to a simple, transparent, and manual polling and counting processes.

Allow effective observation of all election processes; Transparency is the key to creating voter confidence in the integrity and legitimacy of elections, and effective election observation is recognized around the world as the most important factor in promoting transparency. To enable transparency and increase public confidence in the integrity of elections, the Governor, Secretary of State, and state and local election officials must respect international norms and standards, and make all election processes open to effective observation by both partisan and non-partisan observers.

<u>Demand the Secretary of State Investigate Statistical Anomalies</u>; Reliable and credible statistical analysis, the exact methodologies the US promotes for evaluating election in developing countries, when applied in Georgia, reveal extensive election fraud. To restore public confidence in elections, the SOS must initiate investigations to determine the causes of these anomalies, and then develop regulations and procedures to address the gaps in election security that enable fraud.

End impunity for election crimes; There exists in Georgia a culture of lawlessness and impunity from prosecution for cases of election fraud and illegal practice. Clear violations must be investigated or adjudicated by law enforcement agencies, courts and state officials; with those convicted punished to the full extent of the law.

Expose "foreign" funding for campaigns from outside the affected constituency; No country in the world allows foreign funding in their election campaigns, because in a democracy only the citizens who will be represented should have influence on who is elected. The same principle should apply across constituencies in the US. For example, it is incredibly unfair and undemocratic for Silicon Valley moguls or Davos billionaires to influence federal, state and local level races in Georgia. If it is not possible to prohibit these immoral and undemocratic practices, "foreign" funding of Georgia elections must be monitored and exposed, to ensure voters know who is trying to unfairly influence our representatives.

Georgia Commonsense Election Reforms

- End most early and mail-in voting
- Clean bloated and error-ridden voter rolls
- Use manual rather than machinebased voting and counting processes
- Allow effective observation of all election processes
- End impunity for election crimes
- Expose "foreign" funding for campaigns from outside the affected constituency

1.2 Taking Action

In 2022, our objective is to elect candidates committed to making commonsense election reforms that will ensure that all voters' voices are heard, and make it easy to vote and hard to cheat. To achieve this objective will require a concerted effort across the state, and GFAF volunteers have a key role to play.

First, publicize the Commonsense Election Reforms by preparing posters and/or leaflets to put up or pass out in your AOR. The GFAF office will prepare some examples and templates you can use, but feel free to also use your own creativity, and share your creations across the network.

Print the *Commonsense Election Reform Pledge* (in the box at the end of this section), and ask all of your local candidates to sign the pledge. If any will sign, you can use that as a lever to pressure the others, as the coalition will endorse any candidate that signs the pledge. Please let us know who does sign, and who does not.

Write op-eds and letters to the editor for local papers or social media, or get interviewed on local radio. Explain the reforms and endorse the candidates who signed the pledge, and question the fitness of those who have refused to do so.

Enjoy the fine weather, and hold a rally/barbeque/party for election reform. Invite local leaders, candidates, and press. Hang out with like-minded folks, eating burnt meat and drinking beer. And please let us know about anything you do, so we can share your ideas and activities across the GFAF!

Commonsense Election Reform Pledge

I recognize that democracy in Georgia is dependent on free and fair elections, and if elected, I promise to support legislation that will:

- End most early and mail-in voting
- Clean bloated and error-ridden voter rolls
- Use manual rather than machine-based voting and counting processes
- Allow effective observation of all election processes
- End impunity for election crimes
- Expose "foreign" funding for campaigns from outside the affected constituency

Signed	
Candidate for	

2 Serving as a Poll Worker

2.1 Why Serve as a Poll Worker?

Most election cheating and fraud is not possible without collusion from poll workers, so our number one priority role for those interested in promoting election integrity is to serve as a poll worker. From this position you can best prevent or expose efforts to undermine election integrity. Many left-leaning organizations encourage their followers to become poll workers, but there has never been a comparable effort among independent or right-leaning organizations, so currently there is a preponderance of left-leaning poll workers, and in many precincts and election offices the entire team may be left-leaning. Likewise, in some heavily Republican districts there may be too few Democrat officers. When this occurs, one of the essential checks and balances built into the system is missing, and this contributes directly to many voters lack of confidence in the integrity of the election process.

2.2 Qualifications and Renumeration for Poll Workers

To serve as a poll worker, you must be 16 years of age or over and able to read, write, and speak English. Additionally, you must be a resident or employee of the county where you serve as a poll worker, or have permission from your county's election office to work in an adjoining county without causing a worker shortage in your home county. Poll workers are hired and trained by Georgia's 159 counties. While compensation rates may vary by county, poll workers generally earn about \$60 – \$140 per day.

2.3 Great for Students!

Serving as a poll worker is a great opportunity for regular and home-schooled high school students to learn about civics and the process of democracy, while also earning some spending money! With the exception of being qualified and registered voters, students must meet all of the other requirements for election inspectors, are required to receive permission from their school, and are subject to the provisions of child labor laws. Students may not serve as precinct chairpersons. This is also a good opportunity for college students.

Each local board of education and election superintendent is authorized to develop and implement a Student Teen Election Participant (STEP) program. In addition to the qualifications cited above, a student participating in the STEP program must be a United States citizen; have a Georgia driver's license or Georgia state-issued identification card; have demonstrated age-appropriate academic ability for the previous school year; and have a history of responsible school and community behavior. Participants also need written authorization from a parent or legal guardian.

Students will work a minimum of four but not more than six hours during a single election day, and will be provided age-appropriate training. A student who successfully participates in the STEP program shall be counted as present and given full credit for the school day during which he or she served in the STEP program, but no student is allowed to be absent from school for more than two school days. To learn more about this program, contact your County Election Office.

2.4 Process for application and training materials

All hiring and staffing decisions are made by the county. If you are interested in serving as a poll worker, please contact your County Election Office. Contact details for County Election Offices are available here (here (<a href="https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections/countyelectionoffices.do") (<a href="https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections.gov/Elections/countyelectionoffices.do") (<a href="https://elections.gov/Elections

The Georgia Poll Workers Manual for 2021 and other training materials are available here.

2.5 Promoting Election Integrity as a Poll Worker

As a poll worker, you have a legal and moral duty to administer elections that are free and fair for all voters. Although it is unlikely, in the performance of your duties you may witness other officials engaging in practices not consistent with law or regulations. These can be irregularities (i.e., failure to follow law or procedure due to ignorance), or malfeasance (intended to undermine the integrity of the vote).

In some cases, it may be difficult to determine whether an incident is an irregularity or malfeasance, but in every case, inspectors should attempt to rectify the situation. That may be as simple as informing the poll worker of the correct procedure (with reference to official documentation), reporting to the precinct chairperson, or contacting senior election officials. In cases of potentially criminal conduct, refer to the specific guidance below.

GFAF encourages all poll workers to fill in and submit a *Poll Worker Report* after the election. The form is printed below, and available online here. This information (but not your name) will

be combined with information from other poll workers in a public report, and used to evaluate the election process and make recommendations for improving future elections.

2.	6 Poll Worker Report					
	Instructions: fill out the form and send to GFET, or use the online form here : (insert address). If you need additional space for any question, use the back of the form, or attach additional sheets, as					
	eeded.		uitioriai s	neers, e	as	
Na	ame:	Precinct:				
Da	ate Submitted:	County/City:				
	Before the election					
1	Did you receive training before election day?		Yes	_ No	_ N/A	
2	Was your training provided in person or online	?	In pers	on (Online	
	On election day					
3	Did you receive all required equipment for the	polling process?	Yes	_ No	_ N/A	
	If not, what was missing?					
5	Were poll watchers present during preparation	s to open?	Rep_		Dem	
6	Were poll watchers present throughout the day		Rep_		Dem	
7	Were poll watchers present during the closing	process?	Rep_		Dem	
8	Where poll workers representing both the Representies present for all sensitive operations?	ublican and Democratic	Ye	s N	lo	
9	If no, which party had poll workers present for	all sensitive operations?	Rep	Dem	N/A	
			Yes	No	N/A	
11	Did any media or press visit your precinct?	1101.	Yes	_ <u>No</u>	 N/A	
			Over		ormal	
	Did you witness any irregularities or malfeasan	ce during the process?	Yes			
13	(if yes, please provide details on the back of the form)			_ No	_ N/A	
	Please grade the overall efficiency of the pollin					
14						
	failing. If D or E, please provide details on the I					
	Please grade the overall integrity of the polling					
15						
	failing. If D or E, please provide details on the I	oack.				
	Thank you!					

2.7 Reporting Irregularities and Malfeasance

Irregularities are procedural errors that may be caused by a lack of knowledge or a lack of critical materials. Minor irregularities may not affect the integrity of the process, but are indicators of poor training or election management. Some irregularities *can* impact the integrity of the process (such as positioning polling booths so that poll watchers or other voters can see a voter marking a ballot; or preventing poll watchers from effectively observing the election process), and if these are done intentionally, would be considered malfeasance.

We generally think of malfeasance as an intentional effort to undermine the integrity of the election process. If you witness serious malfeasance or what you think may be criminal behavior in the election process, you have several options:

- You can call the Georgia Attorney General's Election Fraud Complaint Hotline at 888-532-0148, or fill in a form on the AG website here. If desired, the form can be submitted anonymously.
- You can call the Georgia Secretary of State's Voter Fraud Hotline at 877-725-9797, or fill out a Stop Voter Fraud form here. This form cannot be submitted anonymously. Your information will be forwarded directly to the Secretary of State's Elections Division, and you may be contacted by an elections investigator for additional information.
- Since state institutions don't have a particularly good track record in investigating or prosecuting election crime in Georgia, we suggest that in addition to submitting a report though one of the channels above, or as an alternative, you submit an *GFAF Incident Report Form*. This form has been designed by legal professionals to ensure sufficient information is collected to form the basis of a legal declaration or affidavit that can be used in any needed follow up. GFAF's legal team will review all incident reports, and follow up with legal action, if warranted. The online incident report form is available here, and a print version is attached below.

2.8 Election Incident Report Form				
Instructions: Please fill in the form as completely as possible as soon as possible after (or during) the incident. Take the time to				
collect names and contact details of other	witnesses. If you coll	lect electronic evidence (picture, video or audio recording), make a		
	, but retain the origin	nal on your phone or other electronic device. Submit the completed		
form as soon as possible to: GFET REPORTER INFORMATION				
Reported by:		Phone:		
Position (voter, election inspector, poll water	cher, etc.):	Email:		
DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT				
Date of incident:	Time of incident:	Were the police notified: Yes / No		
		There are period from the first		
Location of incident:				
Description of the incident (M/Let become	al have it have a said	ata Da an amarifia an anarible Continue an bask if an adad and		
attach additional sheets if necessary)	a, now it nappenea,	etc. Be as specific as possible. Continue on back if needed and		
attach additional sheets if necessary)				
		Tues and the second sec		
Is there electronic evidence of the incident'		What type of evidence is it? Phone photo video audio CCTV Other		
Is the evidence in your possession? Did you witness the incident? Yes 1	YesNo No If no, list	t the person who reported the incident to you below, along with		
Did you willioso the incident.	details o	of any other witnesses. Attach additional sheets if needed.		
WITNESSES				
Name of Witness:		Phone:		
Dala af Milana		Email:		
Role of Witness:		Email:		
Name of Witness:		Phone:		
Tame of Thingson		Thoms.		
Role of Witness:		Email:		
Name of Witness:				
Role of Witness:		Phone:		
Note of Withess.				
Name of Witness:		Phone: Email:		
Role of Witness:		Email:		
PARTIES INVOLVED IN INCIDENT		Email:		
PARTIES INVOLVED IN INCIDENT		Email: Phone:		
		Email: Phone: Email:		
Name:		Email: Phone:		
		Email: Phone: Email:		
Name:		Email: Phone: Email: Phone:		
Name:		Email: Phone: Email: Phone:		
Name: Role: Name:		Email: Phone: Email: Phone: Email: Phone:		
Name: Role:		Email: Phone: Email: Phone: Email:		
Name: Role: Role: Role:		Email: Phone: Email: Phone: Email: Phone: Email:		
Name: Role: Name:		Email: Phone: Email: Phone: Email: Phone:		

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

3 About Election Monitoring and Observation

To help ensure a free and fair election for all voters, GFAF supports a non-partisan program called *Georgia for Election Transparency (GFET)*, which will deploy volunteer observers to monitor election processes and procedures throughout the election cycle. Observers can deter malfeasance and cheating, or by detecting and formally documenting such malfeasance, can deny legitimacy to fraudulent elections and provide evidence for lawsuits and other post-election court cases. By increasing the transparency of the election, observers can enhance public confidence in the integrity of the election process.

Observation will be conducted in phases, beginning with *Pre-Election Observation*. During the pre-election phase observers will look at the voter list, election administration, the legal framework and procedures for elections, and the broader election environment. Pre-election observation seeks to confirm the process, or to highlight potential problems or concerns so that they can be addressed prior to the election. Internationally, pre-election observers are usually referred to as Long-Term Observers or LTOs. LTOs often play an important role in recruiting, training and managing the larger number of volunteers needed for election observation.

GFET pre-election observers are non-partisan. In contrast to partisan observers (poll watchers), they do not represent a specific party. Instead, they represent all voters, and their primary objective is ensuring a free and fair process for all voters, regardless of outcome. Non-partisan observers are normal in other democracies, but still relatively rare in the US, where we have primarily relied on partisan observers. Non-partisan observation provides any voter, regardless of party, the possibility to support free and fair elections; allowing participation by independent voters, and by neutral groups (like church groups) that want to support a fair process, but don't want to affiliate with a particular party.

Election Season Observation – Election observation (poll watching) used to be largely confined to election day, but with long periods of advance voting, and all the opportunities that creates for malfeasance and fraud, we have to develop new approaches to strengthening transparency and deterrence. The primary innovations of the GFET approach are facilitating increased deployment of observers and poll watchers during the advance voting, and the expectation that observers and poll watchers will file regular reports throughout the election season.

Although GFET will continue to deploy its LTOs during election season, its primary focus will be the provision of training and/or materials for party-endorsed poll watchers and independent observers.

Observing Election Day and the Counting Process – Although the actual election day in Georgia is not as important as it used to be because of the long election season, to deter malpractice and enhance transparency on election day will require more poll watchers and observers than any other day. The objective is to detect and deter malfeasance through complete coverage of, and reporting from, all precincts in the state.

Poll watchers may work in shifts organized before election day. They will arrive before the precinct opens to observe set up of the precinct and machines, and will watch the polling process throughout the day, then the counting process after the poll. Each precinct poll watcher (or team) and observer should have a checklist and report form to facilitate monitoring, and the collection of data that can be used to validate or delegitimize the election process at the precinct after the election. In addition, poll watchers will have access to the legal hot line and online incident report forms to report irregularities or malfeasance as they happen.

Post-Election Audits and Reports – After the election, GFET will continue to monitor any post-election audits or court cases. Pre-election, election season and election day reports will be synthesized, and used to develop a comprehensive narrative report on the integrity of the entire election process, with recommendations for needed reforms in advance of the 2024 national elections.

4 Pre-Election Observation

GFET will recruit, train and manage the initial LTO teams. Each team will be made up of 3-4 volunteers, and will be responsible for implementing activities in several counties and/or municipalities during the first phase of observation. Teams will establish and maintain good relations with election officials, and other relevant government and security officials, in their area of operations (AOR). These teams will also facilitate the recruitment and training of additional observers. As the network is built out, we hope to identify coordinators and team members for every county and city in the state. To learn more about how you can volunteer for this effort, please visit gfet.us.

4.1 County Election Official Survey

An initial election official survey should be conducted in a sample of cities and counties. LTO teams should request a meeting with the selected officials in their Area of Operations. A sample request letter is included below. The letter should be sent by email, and immediately followed up by a phone call. Use the sample letter as a guide for the call, explaining who you are and who you represent, and that you are election observers interested in learning more about the election process in the relevant county.

Ideally, all interviews should be conducted within a week of the initial call, so request an early date. If they try to put it off, note that you have a deadline for reporting, and that it would be a shame if they were not represented in the state report. During the interview, be respectful, non-confrontational, and non-partisan. Express our common objective of excellent elections that are accepted by all as fair and credible.

Prior to conducting the interview, you will be provided with an online video briefing on the questionnaire by GFET staff. The questionnaire is attached below. During the interview, please record responses directly on the form, using additional pages if required. After completing the questionnaire, you may want to ask additional questions specific to your AOR, but don't take up too much time.

Make arrangements with the official to follow up by email or phone to collect any information that wasn't available during your visit. Thank the official for his/her time, and note that you look forward to remaining in touch throughout the election cycle.

After leaving the office, please photograph your forms, and email them to report@gfet.us. As soon as possible, please enter the information from the form into the electronic form on the website.

4.1.1 Tips for getting an appointment with a registrar for the survey

Get ready

- Gather information for your county: registrar name, phone number, email, physical address
- Start a page in a notebook for each election office that you plan to visit
- Let your team know that you are hoping to get some appointments and that you will need immediate feedback to confirm their availability.

Remember

- *Be confident, polite, and friendly.*
- It's absolutely our right to ask questions, but we don't want to be confrontational.
- We want to establish a relationship, and don't want to burn any bridges

Contact the official

- Preferable to call they can't avoid you as easily, and you can keep it informal and friendly
- Email is a good way to follow up to let confirm the appointment

Introduce yourself

- Explain that you are working with GFAF on a statewide initiative to visit election officials.
- "We are a non-partisan group looking to educate citizens about our election process"
- "We want to show people some of the behind the scenes aspects and help them gain confidence in our election process"
- So far we've met with about 5 (this number will be growing obviously) Definitely mention if you have met with another registrar nearby

Ask for the interview

- "We have developed a survey with about 30 questions"
- "I think it should take about an hour at the most"
- "How about tomorrow or later this week"

Document the call

- Record the date and time you called
- Who you spoke to, when/if you need to call back

Tips provided by Johanna Carrington, Lancaster County, Va.

4.1.2 Sample Request Letter

From: Georgia for Election Transparency

(county or city) Observer Team

(email address)

To: (title)

(county or city) (email address)

Subj: Request for meeting

Date: XXXXXXX

Dear (official);

Georgia for Election Transparency is a group dedicated to transparent and credible election processes. We are engaging students, first time voters, and other citizens in learning more about the process in hopes they will continue to be part of our elections either as poll workers, poll watchers, or volunteers.

Our findings will be shared publicly in hopes that it will increase transparency and public confidence in election processes, and to provide the public with the information needed to accurately evaluate the integrity of current processes and procedure.

As part of our civic engagement work, we are conducting a survey of election officials across the state, and would like to request a meeting with you this week to conduct that survey, and to introduce our team. These meetings will facilitate greater learning for our network, allowing them to act as a sort of "ambassador" to other groups regarding the local operations. This is meant to be a positive experience, with positive outcomes, for both citizens and local election office. We anticipate the meeting in total will last about 45 minutes. Please email or call me to confirm a suitable time.

Sincerely,

XXXXXX Coordinator XXXX Observer Team

4.1.3 Election Official Survey Form

Georgi		SURVEY OF COUNTY E VISORS/DIRECTORS/SU		
County:		County Seat:		
Congressio State Sena State Hous			<u>-</u>	
Date of Int Supervisor	erview: /Superintendent/Director:			
	of registered voters who voted i of registered voters who voted i		<u> </u>	
(b) Time ar	nd date of initial call and e-mail: nd date of response: Registrar refuse to meet with you	ı? YES	NO	
(d) If yes,	provide the reason given for not r	neeting with you:		
There is no its left up t a) Were y b) If appoi	uniform system in Georgia of ch o each County's Charter to decide ou elected or ap nted, by who? g is your term?	oosing the Senior Electic	on official in each county	and
d) How ma	ny precincts in your county? of registered voters in your coun	ty?		
f) Percenta	ge of registered voters who vote age of registered voters who vot	d in the last 2020 election	on	
(<u>1</u>)	What is your biggest concern ab	out the upcoming electi	ons?	

Georgia Titi

2022 LTEO

SURVEY OF COUNTY ELECTION SUPERVISORS/DIRECTORS/SUPERINTENDENTS

	Any other major concerns?
	Yes Don't know:
	No No Answer/Refused:
(-1	
(2)	Comments:
	Do you feel like you have the resources, equipment, personnel, and training needed to
	to run an effective election in November
(3)	
1. 2	
	If no, what is missing? What resources do you need?
	<u> </u>
(4)	
	Each county's Board of Elections are set up differently in Georgia. Who serves on
	your Board of Elections?
	l [*]
(5)	
1. 2	(a) is there a college President on your board of Elections? If yes, which college?
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	How many Superintendents of Elections are there in this county?
(6)	(a) Who supervises their work?
1. 2	
	Is the county Board of Elections engaged in election work year-round, or mostly
	near elections?
	Year Round:
	Mostly Near Elections:
(7)	Don't know:
(-)	
	(a) How often do they meet?
	(b) How is the public notified of their meeting?



SURVEY OF COUNTY ELECTION SUPERVISORS/DIRECTORS/SUPERINTENDENTS

	VOLER KOLL MANAGEMENT:
	When was the last time the voter rolls were scrubbed or cleansed of voters who no
	longer live at their address of record, or deceased voters? (Enter date, time, and the
	number of days since the last audit)
(8)	Date:
1. 2	Time:
	Number of days since the last audit:
	Does the Health Department/Coroner/Funeral Home/or Bureau of Vital Statistics send
	a list of deceased people to your office every month so they can be removed from the
	voter rolls?
2-5	
(9)	Is that list public and available upon request:
	· · · · —
	If no, how often do you receive a list of deceased people and from whom?
	When was the last time the Clerk of Courts submitted a list of individuals who declined
(10)	to serve on jury duty on the basis of being a non-citizen
	When was the last time your office had access to the National Change of Address List?
(11)	Date:
()	Other relevant lists:
	Are you confident that the voter file in your county is accurate and up to date?
	Yes
	No
fami	Don't Know:
(12)	No Answer/Refused:
	If not, what is/are your main concern(s) about the list?
	` ``
	How many households in your county have more than 7 individual registered voters
	living at the same address? Number (If unknown, ask the Supervisor that he / she
(13)	forward information to you ASAP



SURVEY OF COUNTY ELECTION SUPERVISORS/DIRECTORS/SUPERINTENDENTS

	Third parties are permitted to register other individuals to vote Concerning this:
	(a) Is there a log of third party entities registering individuals to vote?
	(b) Is there a log of the third party entitity's required training?
	(c) Third party entities must transmit a summary sheet providing their organization name, physical address of the entity member submitting the names of the
(14)	registrants, and the total number of registrants submitted.
(14)	Is this information stored and available to the public to review? Yes: No:
	If yes, please explain:
	(d) Third party entities must maintain the confidentiality and security of the regi.
	Does the Board of Elections audit these confidentiality and secrurity measures? Yes: No:
	Yes: No:
	If yes, please explain:
Consumer 1	on users reinad across the country about the accuracy and interests of untime machines in
	rns were raised across the country about the accuracy and integrity of voting machines in 20 elections.
	20 elections. In 2020, Optical scanners and electronic poll books were adopted as the required
	In 2020, Optical scanners and electronic poll books were adopted as the required system. Electronic ballot markers and tabulators are used. Have you found these to be
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the 20	In 2020, Optical scanners and electronic poll books were adopted as the required system. Electronic ballot markers and tabulators are used. Have you found these to be problematic? Are they better for the voters and for the accuracy of the counting?
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(15)	In 2020, Optical scanners and electronic poll books were adopted as the required system. Electronic ballot markers and tabulators are used. Have you found these to be problematic? Are they better for the voters and for the accuracy of the counting? Who calibrates the voting machines in this county? Name of Company:
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SURVEY OF COUNTY ELECTION SUPERVISORS/DIRECTORS/SUPERINTENDENTS

	Do you invite outside groups in to witness the cabilibration? Yes: No:
(17)	Party Representatives: The Media:
	THE MEDIA.
	Are your voting machines ever connected to the Internet?
	Yes: No:
(18)	Don't Know: No Answer/Refused:
(20)	
	ges in election procedures were introduced in response to the COVID19 pandemic, and
some neon	ges in election procedures were introduced in response to the COVID19 pandemic, and le have argued that these changes weakened the integrity of our state's election process.
	at the signed and state similar meaning and more property of our state statement process.
	Storage areas must have electronic surveillance, keypad locks or e-locks, and the
	surveillance must be connected to an outside monitoring source. Do you have this set
	up in your county?
(19)	
	(a) Have there been problems with this since its implementation?
	The polling places require voting systems to be stored in secured and protected areas prior to, and right after use. How is this implemented in your county?
	prior to, and right after use. How is this implemented in your county:
	Who ensures that this is done in accordance with the law?
(20)	WITO CITAL CITAL CONT. IN OCCUPANTE WITH CITAL CONT.
	(a) How are the climate control requirements monitored and audited at the variety of
	polling locations found throughout the county/city?
	There are a lot of concerns in Georgia and others across the nation about the security
	and the integrity of the ballot drop boxes. What are the chain of custody procedures
	for ballot drop boxes in your county?
(na)	
(21)	



SURVEY OF COUNTY ELECTION SUPERVISORS/DIRECTORS/SUPERINTENDENTS

		e during the last election cycle when your drop boxes did not have			
	video monitoring?				
	Yes:				
(22)	No				
	Don't Know:				
	No Answer/Refuse	d			
	How will you ensur	re only one ballot at a time can be inserted into a ballot drop box and			
	that there will be no 'repeat" visits (or mules) to the drop boxes?				
(23)					
		for reviewing the video, and were the party observers/			
(24)		esent during the review? Yes: No:			
()	Person Responsible	E:			
		nce in the integrity of elections, we hope to expand our efforts and			
have a fev		lection pages, non-partisan observers, and party observers.			
		rty chairs been notified that they are entitled to send observers to			
	your office each day that it is open and receiving in-person absentee ballots?				
	Yes:	Don't Know:			
(25)	No:	No Answer/Refused:			
1/					
	Do you have a pub	lication that you provide to your election officials regarding rights			
		s of observers? Is it available on-line to the public?			
	Yes:	Don't Know:			
	No:	No Answer/Refused:			
(26)					
		uch a publication, would you be willing to distribute such a			
	publication based	u u			
	Yes:	Don't Know:			
	No:	No Answer/Refused:			



SURVEY OF COUNTY ELECTION SUPERVISORS/DIRECTORS/SUPERINTENDENTS

	Since 2020, voting component maifunctions must be reported to the election
	superintendent. Has there been reports of malfunctions in this locality and if so, how were
	they handled?
(27)	•
()	
	Did you receive any funding or in-kind contributions for training, staff, voter education
	or equipment, or any other purpose from outside the State of Georgia?
	Yes:
(28)	
	No: No Answer/Refused:
	Would you provide training and support, or designate a nuetral party to provide
	training and support, for an election day page/poll watcher training program in
	accordance with Georgia law?
(29)	Yes: Don't Know:
	No: No Answer/Refused:
	Dominion Voting Systems has repeadedly refused to release it's software information to
	the public for "proprietary" reasons. Would you support the state awarding it's voting
	system contract to another vendor in the interest of election transparency?
(30)	



SB202 SURVEY OF ELECTIONS SUPERINTENDENTS/DIRECTORS/SUPERVISORS

I would like to get your honest opinion on SB202 "The Election Integrity Act", and ask you a few questions on how this new law has affected past elections as well as the upcoming November elections. Did you support passage of this legislation? WENT. (1)New Do you think the reforms made will go to improving election integrity in your county? Yes: (2)Noc Have all of the reforms mentioned in the new law been made? Yes: Noc If not, do you believe your office will have sufficient time to implement them before (3) the upcoming elections? Yest Noc Are there any areas of concerns you believe the new law did not address? Yes: Noc (4) If so, what are they? Have you identified any areas of confusion or unclear directions or conflicts in the new law? Yes: Noc (5) If so, what are they? Do you believe the early voting period is just right, not enough or too long? Just Right: (6) Not Enough: Too Long:



SB202 SURVEY OF ELECTIONS SUPERINTENDENTS/DIRECTORS/SUPERVISORS

(7)	Prior to the new law, how many drop-boxes did you have in your county?
(8)	Under the new law, how many drop boxes will you be allowed?
	Under the new law, how do you plan on monitoring the ballot drop boxes and
	ensuring that only one ballot is inserted at a time?
(9)	
(3)	
	Where will the ballot drop box(es) be located?
(10)	
(200)	
Please cha	racterize your interaction with the Elections Superintendent/Supervisor/Director. Check
all that app	
	pry-
-	
Heloful	
merprui	
Polite	
Defensive	<u></u>
Unhelpful	
	
Antagonist	lie .
_	
The St. 100 and 100 and 100	RVEY TEAM: Thank you so much for all you have done and will do to ensure free and fair
elections t	his November in Georgia. Please submit your completed survey forms as soon as possible
	owing address:
sallison.	theamericaproject@gmail.com

4.2 Other Possibilities for Pre-Election Observation

You may wish to conduct interviews with political party chairs in your county, to gain a greater understanding of their concerns with the election process. These interviews may be conducted by phone. If your county election office has public meetings about election issues, you should send observers to those to ask questions, and report on issues discussed. These meetings may also be a good time to raise specific concerns you have with the transparency or integrity of the election process.

A sample report format for such a meeting is included below:

- 1. Name of county/city
- 2. Did the county/city hold a meeting this month? If no, end report. If yes,
- 3. Agenda of meeting (this is often included in the meeting notice)
- 4. Decisions of the meeting
- 5. Any other issues

At the state level, GFET leadership may conduct similar interviews with relevant officials from the Secretary of State's Election Division.

5 Rights and Duties of Poll Watchers

The following summary includes information from the Poll Watcher Training Manual provided by the Georgia Secretary of State here.

Poll watchers are official observers only whose primary concern is the integrity and fairness of the election. They may observe the conduct of the election before, during and after the polls close. A poll watcher should be able to see and verify all election processes (except a voter marking their ballot), but may not interfere with or impede the conduct of any election. A poll manager may eject a poll watcher from the polling place if they deemed to be interfering in the process (if this happens to you, immediately file an Incident Report).

When you arrive at a polling place, show your designation letter to the poll manager, and wear your name badge while working. Election officials must allow you behind the enclosed space for the purpose of observing the conduct of the election and the counting and recording of votes, as long as you are not impeding the process. If you are ever prevented from effectively observing a process, inform the poll manager, and if not corrected, file an Incident Report. If you witness an infraction or irregularity, the State of Georgia suggests you report that to your election superintendent, not to the poll manager.

Poll Watchers are prohibited from:

- Talking to voters
- Checking electors lists
- Using photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices
- Using cellular telephones
- Wearing anything advertising a candidacy or advocating for or against an issue.

• Electioneering or any kind of campaigning in the polling place or within 150 feet of the entrance of the polling place during voting hours.

6 Election Season Observation

6.1 What is Election Season?

Any registered voter in Georgia can vote absentee, by mail or drop box, or by visiting an advance voting site. Although absentee ballots can be requested from 78 days prior to the election, we have defined *election season* as the 29-day period from the initial mailing of absentee ballots (October 10) to the election day (November 8). During this period voted ballots can be returned, and from October 11, any qualified voter can vote in person at an advance voting site.

Unfortunately, expanding the election from one day to 29 days decreases the transparency and credibility of its election process. Throughout the election season, chain of custody and chain of observation are regularly broken for long periods, reducing the transparency needed to reassure voters that the process is fair and accurate. Extending the election period also places an unsustainable physical and financial burden on overworked election officials, and the party representatives tasked with ensuring the integrity and legitimacy of the election process.

This imperfect system falls far short of accepted norms and standards for transparent and credible elections, and will require fundamental legal and procedural reforms to ever meet or exceed those standards. Until these reforms can be made, the only means to enhance transparency and public confidence in the integrity of the process will be through increased public scrutiny of every stage of the process to the extent possible.

Election season observation may be conducted by poll watchers authorized and coordinated by county or city party unit chairs, and in some cases by independent observers. The GFET program seeks to increase election season observation by providing training and materials for pollwatchers and observers.

6.2 Monitoring Mail-In and Drop-Box Absentee Voting

One of the reasons absentee voting has previously been limited is because it is inherently insecure. Absentee voting enables cheating through ghost voters and ballot (or drop) box stuffing, political pressure and intimidation, vote buying and selling, and other forms of fraud. When it was limited primarily to soldiers and diplomats on duty for the US government, plus very limited exceptions for individuals with provable need, the risks were deemed acceptable; but with the introduction of widespread and sometimes universal (as in Georgia) postal voting, gaps in security can be easily exploited to alter election outcomes.

Because postal voting occurs in private, malpractice is difficult to monitor and control. A spouse or relative in an abusive relationship, or workers on a farm or in a factory, or the elderly and patients confined in a care facility, may be forced to apply for an absentee ballot, and then be forced to vote the ballot for a particular candidate or party, all out of sight of monitors or law enforcement officials. In Georgia, photo ID is required for early in-person or election day voting, but not required for postal voting, enabling impersonation.

Controlling abuse in the home is difficult, but some deterrence can be expected from public education on the right to vote in secret and to vote your conscience; with a contact number or hotline provided to report abuse. For large farms, factories, businesses, and especially care homes; observers should visit (or recruit a patriot insider) and ask the following questions:

- 1. Has anyone asked or required or offered to help you apply for an absentee ballot?
- 2. Has anyone offered to help you fill in an absentee ballot?
- 3. Has anyone tried to force you, or pay you, to vote a particular way?

Answers to these questions will help you determine if there is a possibility that organized vote fraud is occurring in the location.

Regrettably, homes for the elderly and those requiring cognitive care are particular targets for vote thieves, so it may be important to recruit patriot insiders in these institutions who can monitor and record the activities of people offering to "help" with applications or voting. The best deterrent for this form of theft, which is a felony, is to ensure the thieves know we are watching, and know they will go to prison if caught.

6.3 Monitoring In-Person Absentee Voting

In Georgia, in-person early voting is accomplished by visiting an early voting location and filling in an absentee ballot request, then casting a ballot in the same manner as a voter on election day. You can find the early voting locations in your county by <u>visiting the Secretary of State's website</u> and selecting your county of residence from the list.

Poll watchers can monitor the process at early voting locations as they would at a polling station on election day. If it is not possible to have poll watchers continuously at all early voting locations, then visits can be conducted at any time during hours of operation, and when possible, please vary the times of your visits.

When you arrive at the office, introduce yourself to the staff, explaining your purpose. If you are refused entrance, or not allowed to witness any process (except marking a ballot), include that in your report. For example, if you are visiting an office, but when you arrive are told you cannot enter for any reason (no space, not authorized, closed early, etc.), please submit a report with the date, time, place, and reason given.

Set-up and Closing: On the first day of the advance voting period, prior to any votes being cast on ballot scanners, the registrars will verify that the seals for each electronic ballot marker, ballot scanner, and ballot box are intact and that there is no evidence or indication of any tampering with the seal or the component. The registrars and two witnesses sworn as poll officers will then run a zero tape on each ballot scanner, then sign the tape. The registrars will also verify that the electronic ballot markers and ballot scanners all indicate zero counts prior to the opening of the polls.

If at the close of voting on any day there are more than 1,500 ballots inside any ballot box, the registrar and two sworn witnesses shall unseal the ballot box, remove the paper ballots, and place

the ballots in a container. The registrars will fill in and sign a transfer form, which includes machine number and number of votes cast; then attach that to the container and seal the container.

The registrar and at least one sworn witness shall deliver the ballot container to the election superintendent for secured storage until time for the tabulation of votes, and the election superintendent shall complete a chain of custody form indicating the delivery of the secure container. The form shall be signed by the registrar and any witnesses who travelled with the registrar indicating that no sealed documents were unsealed enroute and have not been tampered with. In the discretion of the registrar, the same procedure for emptying the ballot box may be followed if there are less than 1,500 ballots in the ballot box at the end of any advance voting day

6.4 Drop boxes for absentee ballots

Drop boxes for absentee ballots were introduced or their use increased during the COVID-19 elections of 2020. Drop boxes have been shown to enable election fraud, and to address this, the Georgia legislature included new rules for the use of drop boxes in SB202. Drop boxes may now only be located inside a building at an early voting location, and are only open during advance voting hours, where they should be under the direct supervision of an election official.

It is difficult to monitor drop boxes effectively, which is one reason so few people have confidence in their security. Drop boxes will be unlocked and opened to confirm there are no ballots inside at the beginning of each day of advance voting. At the end of the day, the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk shall arrange for the collection, by at least two sworn election officials, and return of ballots deposited at each drop box.

The collection team will sign a form that includes the date, number of ballots collected, confirmation that the drop box was locked after removing the ballots, and the identity of each person collecting the ballots. The collection team will then transfer the ballots to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk, who will process and store the ballots in the same manner as absentee ballots returned by mail are processed and stored. Observation of these drop boxes is most important at the beginning of the day to confirm they are empty, and at the end of the day, when ballots are collected.

7 Observing the Voting and Counting Processes on Election Day

7.1 Before you Go

Before election day, please read through the observation guidelines. Prepare a lunch or dinner, if needed, and you might like a thermos of coffee or tea. Make sure you have the contact details for your coordinator, and your ID card and designation letter, and an email address or phone number for the election superintendent responsible for your polling place. Fully-charge your phone, and don't forget a pencil or pen, and your manual and checklist (some may have those on their phone).

7.2 Opening the Polls

At least one hour prior to the time set to open the polls, the voting machines and supplies will be delivered to the polling places in each precinct. The machines will be set up in the proper manner, signs, sample ballots and other instructions will be posted, and other supplies will be distributed.

If you will be in a precinct all day, or have the first observation shift, you should plan to arrive at your assigned precinct by 6:30 am, a half hour before opening, so you can observe preparations. On entering a precinct, show your ID card and designation letter to the poll manager. During your time in the precinct be calm and respectful, and avoid talking to voters. If you have questions or concerns, address those to the manager.

After setting up the polling place, poll workers will swear an oath to administer the election fairly. With any poll watchers present in attendance, they will then confirm the seals on the voting machines are unbroken, and that the numbers on the seals match those in the log, then will open the machines to confirm there are no ballots in the main storage area and the emergency storage area.

The manager will then print a report from each machine. The report, called a zero tape, should list all candidates for the election, with vote totals of zero. The manager will keep the zero tape, but you should be able to confirm that all candidates who should be on the ballot are listed on the zero tape, and that the totals for each candidate are zero.

At 7:00 the chair will announce the polls are open, and allow voters waiting outside into the precinct.

Observer Note: For elections to be transparent and credible, poll watchers must be able to effectively observe all election processes, and record their observations. If you are prevented from or hindered in observing any process (except a voter in the process of marking a ballot) at any time during the polling or counting, that is a serious offence, and should be challenged. If the challenge does not result in immediate relief, record the circumstance on an incident report form, and submit that immediately.

7.3 The Polling Process

Voters will go first to the check-in table near the entrance, and show their ID, then sign the electronic voter certificate. A poll worker will find them on the Poll Pad, and if they are registered and have not voted, they will be issued a voter access card (the card they insert into the BMD units), and added to the Numbered List of Voters.

The voter is then directed to the BMD touchscreen units. They will insert the voter access card into the machine, select their candidates for each election, review their choices, and select "print ballot". Once the voter prints their ballot, the card will pop out of the machine. At this point, voters will confirm their choices have been accurately recorded on the printed ballot.

The voter will then take their printed ballot and voter card to a worker near the polling place scanner. The voter returns voter card, and is reminded to review their ballot. The voter enters the scanner space and casts the ballot by inserting it into the scanner, and the screen will confirm that

their ballot was cast. When a voter exits the enclosed space the receive their "I'm a Georgia Voter I SECURED MY VOTE" sticker, and are thanked, and then exit the polling place.

7.4 Closing the Poll and the Counting Process

At 7:00 the chair will announce the polls are closed, and prevent anyone else from joining a line, but anyone in line at closing will be allowed to vote. When all votes have been cast, the Poll Pad will be shut down. Next, the manager will enter a password in the scanner, close the poll, and the machine will automatically print three copies of the report.

As a poll watcher, you can ask for a copy of the report, but you will need to ask let them know before they close the machine. If they do not provide one, you should photograph or hand copy the results tape they are required to post on the door of the polling place, as this information will be needed for your report. If you are not allowed to collect the results, immediately submit an incident report.

When this process is over, your observation is complete. Please fill in the observation form, if you have not already, and submit immediately.

Thank you for your dedication to free and fair elections in Georgia!

7.5 Poll Watcher Report Forms

During your observation, you will not be allowed to use a cell phone, so don't forget to take a set of paper forms with you for notes. After the observation, you can copy your responses into the online form using a cell phone, tablet, or computer. We prefer that you submit your report, and any incident reports, using your phone, tablet or laptop, as that saves us time; but if that is not possible for any reason, please do not hesitate to fill in and submit the paper forms, as it is most important that we get your information in any format. Paper forms can be submitted in person, scanned and sent as PDFs, or simply photographed and emailed. Print versions of the Poll Watcher Report Form and Incident Report Form are included below.

The online Poll Watcher Report form is available here

The online Election Incident Report form is available <u>here</u>

		Ge	org	ia Poll '	Watc	her Rep	ort Fo	rm				
Precinct:				Name:								
Address:				Phone No:								
City/Town:				Email:								
County:			Arrival:			Departure:						
·				Instruct				Depart	uic.			
Rec	nd the questions carefully. Pla	ease make	a ch				r If you o	cannot a	answar th	e auestion	or it is	not
	evant, leave it blank. If clarifi											
	vented from observing any pi											
-	incident report.	occoss, pro				c	i ij iiic cii		15 1101 10.	301700, 111111	,	Jule
								Yes	No			
1	Were you allowed to observ	e the set-	up of				if no, pre	pare an	d immedi	ately file		
1	an incident report)											
2	Are all polling team members and required materials present?											
3												
4	Did the poll workers swear	an oath to	cond	duct fair ele	ctions?							
5	Did the polling manager con	nfirm the	seals	on the mac	hines w	ere unbroke	n, and tha	at the n	umbers o	n the seals		
)	matched the numbers in the	log?										
6	Did the poll workers open the	ne tabulat	ors aı	nd show yo	u that th	ne main and	emergen	cy boxe	es were er	npty,		
	before resealing the machine	es?										
7	Was a zero tape printed and											
8	Were you able to confirm the				idates, a	and showed	no votes?	?				
9	Did the precinct open on tin	ne (7:00 <i>A</i>	AM)?									
				The Poll							Yes	No
10	Were you able to see voter's											
11	Could voters mark and cast	their ball	ots in	secret, with	hout any	yone see hov	w they vo	ted? (if	no, give	details in		
	the comment section)											
12	Were any voters challenged											
13	Were any provisional votes				ber and	relevant de	tails in th	e comn	nent section	on)		
14	Were poll watchers present											
15	Were any poll watchers pres										T 7	2.7
1.5	Did to the total			he Poll and	the Co	ounting Pro	cess				Yes	No
16	Did the polling place close a				2							
17	Were voters in the line at cl						2.1 . 1 1	1 . 0 .		.•		
Were there any ballots in the emergency (auxiliary) ballot storage area of the tabulator? (if yes Manager, and provide explanation in comment section, or file incident report)		if yes, que	estion									
19				nent section	n, or 1116	e incident re	port)					
20	Was a results report run on			rr) the meanl	ta tama f	mone the see	nnan? (if a	no filo	on incide	nt non out)		
21	Were you given a copy (or a Were you allowed to observ											
<u> </u>				i uie poiiiiį						l report)		
22	Record the total number of voters from Poll Pad Record the total number of ballots cast from scanner											
1	Did the total number of vote	e cast fro	m the	tabulator i			l number	of vote	rs checke	d off in		
23	the Poll Pad? (If no, provide								is checke	a on m		
24	Which political party do you			Republic		Democ		Othe	r·			1
	Wineir pointed party do you	_				and the tota						
	Candidate Name	Votes			late Nam		Votes		Candida	ite Name		Votes

Comments

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Georgia Poll Watcher Incident Report Form Instructions: Please fill in the form as completely as possible as soon as possible after (or during) the incident. Take the time to collect names and contact details of other witnesses. If you collect electronic evidence (picture, video or audio recording), make a copy of the file and submit with your report, but retain the original on your phone or other electronic device. Submit the completed form as soon as possible to: GFET REPORTER INFORMATION Reported by: Phone: Position (voter, election inspector, poll watcher, etc.): Email: DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT Date of incident: Time of incident: Were the police notified: Yes / No Location of incident: Description of the incident: (What happened, how it happened, etc. Be as specific as possible. Continue on back if needed and attach additional sheets if necessary) Is there electronic evidence of the incident? Yes What type of evidence is it? Phone photo__ video__ No audio_ Is the evidence in your possession? Yes No_ CCTV Other_ Did you witness the incident? Yes No If no, list the person who reported the incident to you below, along with details of any other witnesses. Attach additional sheets if needed. **WITNESSES** Name of Witness: Phone: Role of Witness: Email: PARTIES INVOLVED IN INCIDENT Phone: Name: Role: Email: Name: Phone: Role: Email: Name: Phone: Role: Email:

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

8 Voter Registration Audits

8.1 Introduction

An accurate and complete voter roll is the foundation of secure and credible elections. Although relatively uncommon in the U.S., voter registration audits are a common tool used in other democracies by legislators, election administrators, election observers, and other stakeholders to assess the overall accuracy of a voter register, and to provide the information needed for effective reforms. Voter registration audits can also provide evidence of some forms of election malpractice.

A typical audit will include an initial assessment of the registration process as defined in law and regulation; an IT-based audit of the register (if appropriate); and random sample-based surveys of voters to assess the accuracy of the register. The scope and focus of the surveys can be general, or targeted at specific aspects of the register, depending on the priorities of sponsor.

Voter registration audits are of particular interest to civil society-based election integrity organizations because, unlike other types of election audits, they can be conducted without the participation of local government or election officials.

8.1.1 General Voter Registration Audit

The survey portion of a comprehensive voter registration audit may include two different tests, referred to as *list-to-people* and *people-to-list*. Whether one or both tests are included in an audit would be determined by priorities and available resources.

The *list-to-people* test involves surveying a random sample of voters drawn from the voter list to determine the accuracy of the list, including the percentage of moved or deceased voters on the list. The *list-to-people* test can also reveal fraud, if voter history is included in the survey. For example, if the surveyor finds a voter has moved or died or never lived at the address, that shows error in the list; but if the same voter is listed as having cast a ballot in an election after they moved or died, that shows fraud.

The *people-to-list* test measures the proportion of eligible citizens listed on the list (comprehensiveness). For example, if you survey a random sample of 1000 citizens who would be eligible to vote, and confirm 780 are on the voter list, you have a registration rate of 78%. If you know the total number of citizens in an area who meet the age and residence requirements to vote from the census, and calculate 78% of that total, then that number should equal (within the margin of error) the total number of registered voters on the voter list.

Typically, the number of voters on the list will be greater than the number calculated from the census, because the list still includes some voters who have moved or died. The percentage over your calculated number will be the magnitude of error or bloat in the list. A well-maintained list might be just a few percent off, while a poorly maintained list could contain 50 or 100% more names than actual voters. This is important, as a bloated list can be used to facilitate fraud, and also skews turnout percentages.

A general voter registration audit with a *list-to-people* test, or both a *list-to-people* and a *people-to-list* test, would be most appropriate when the priority is to drive reform of the voter registration process.

8.1.2 Targeted Audit

A targeted audit is primarily focused on just one aspect of the voter list, or one period in time. A targeted audit would normally be based on the voter list, so would be a *list-to-people* test.

An example of a targeted audit was conducted in Virginia in 2021. The election commission reported weekly the names of people who had returned absentee ballots during Virginia's 45-day voting season, and after the first week an election integrity organization ran that list through commercial software to identify suspect addresses, then drew a sample from that list and sent surveyors to confirm that the submitted ballots came from qualified voters. They found that at least 5.7% of absentee ballots submitted during the first week of polling came from addresses where the voter was unknown, or was known but had moved well before the election.

A targeted audit can be conducted at any time using this method, not just during the advance voting period or for absentee ballots. A voter list with voter history is processed through commercial software that identifies a likely mismatch between the voter's listed name and address, and their actual address. A sample from the processed list is then surveyed, and the percentage confirmed as bad addresses during the election period in question can then be applied to the whole list to yield a minimum number of fraudulent votes (this is a minimum number because the commercial software may not catch all bad addresses, and because fraud may have occurred in other ways).

A targeted audit might be most appropriate when the priority is to prove that this type of fraud occurred in a previous election. This type of audit would be less effective at driving reform of registration processes than a general VRA.

8.1.3 IT-Based Audit

An IT audit might be an examination of the machines and processes used for voter registration, or could be a machine-run analysis or test based on available data. The list screening process for bad addresses described above is one type of IT-based audit. IT audits can be easier and cheaper to conduct, because they don't require fieldwork, but are less accurate and therefore less credible than more intensive audits; making them most useful when an overview is needed, or as part of a more in-depth audit.

Types of IT Based Audits

- Comparison of voter registry with obituaries.
 Comparison of voter history across states to detect double voting
- Compare the voter registry with census data
 Compare voter history with post-election registry to identify registrants who voted and then were purged from the list

8.1.4 Sampling

Surveys or canvassing without a sampling frame can reveal the existence of errors or fraud, but not their prevalence, and consequently such surveys have less impact in driving reform than sample-based surveys. While it is slightly more difficult to survey using a robust sampling methodology, doing so will allow accurate characterization of the area being surveyed, so it is well worth the extra effort.

If it is too difficult to do a random sample of a whole state, you can use a multistage random sampling methodology. For example, a random sample of counties, then a random sample of precincts, then a random sample of voters. It's actually a bit more complicated than that, but the science is well-known, and accessible, as it is used by polling firms all the time.

Another option is to limit the size of the survey area. If the auditing organization is strong in only some parts of the state, several counties can be selected as sampling areas. For example; if you do three counties across the state, you can accurately (authoritatively) characterize the situation in each of those counties, compare and contrast results across those counties, and hypothesize about the causes of similarities and differences. This is enough for a good report and may be enough to spur reform, or further investigation.

While a limited but rigorous and representative audit is more useful than no audit, or an unrepresentative audit, a comprehensive audit is preferred is possible. A comprehensive audit provides the most possible useful data; but can also be a tool for the organization to build out and strengthen their network across the state.

8.2 Conducting a Voter Registration Audit

8.2.1 Process Map

- a. Decide what type of audit you want to do. Consider your priorities (voter list reform or revealing previous malpractice). Also consider what types of data are available.
- b. Decide the area you will audit (state-wide or counties/municipalities).
- c. Acquire relevant data.
- d. Draft the questionnaire. Most of this should be off-the-shelf, with minor changes based on priorities and local conditions. While drafting questionnaire, also do an outline of the report. This will help ensure your questionnaire captures the information you need for your report.
- e. Draw the sample.
- f. Test the questionnaire
- g. Build questionnaire app for ipad or cellphone (primarily off-the-shelf)
- h. Recruit and train enumerators/canvassers.
- i. Field work and data collection.
- j. Analysis and report.
- k. Develop recommendations.
- 1. Present report (press, radio, TV, election commission, executive and legislative branches, and judicial branch/law enforcement if significant violations have been found).

8.2.2 General Voter Registration Audit

Sample – Either households or individual voters. If households, could any registered voter be the respondent or do we need something like a kish grid? Timing? How do we manage "no one home" or "voter not home"? I think we will probably just have to over-sample, and record limitations in the methodology.

Draft Questionnaire

inhabitant

a. Does the address exist? Y/N if Y, go to next field, if N, record and

b. Did someone respond to the knock?

Y/N if Y, go to next field, if N, record and

end
c. Can I speak to X?

If home, wait. If not home, ask any

d. Did you, or anyone else present now, live here during the fall of 2020? (if no, end)

e. I'm checking the accuracy of the voter roll, which lists the following people as registered voters at this address (show list). Can you tell me if they lived here during the fall of 2020?

Responses: don't recognize

Yes, lived here

Used to live here, but moved before period in question

Died

f. I don't want to know who you voted for, but can you tell me, did you vote in 2020?

This questionnaire should yield percent of voters on the list who have moved or died or are unknown at the address (error in the list), and (if we have voter history) the percent of fraudulent votes cast in the missing voters' names.

8.2.3 Targeted Voter Registration Audit

The exact shape of a targeted audit would depend on specific local priorities, but one similar to that done in Virginia could be conducted by screening the relevant voter register to identify voters that likely did not live at the listed address, but were shown as having voted in the last election. This set would be potential fraudulent votes. A representative sample of these addresses would then be canvassed to verify information and collect affidavits.

In the 2021 Virginia statewide elections, the IT-based audit suggested 7.5% of absentee ballots submitted in the first week of polling came from suspect addresses, and that was further refined to 5.7% though canvassing. This formed the floor for fraudulent votes, as the initial screen likely missed some people that moved or died, as it incorrectly identified some who had not moved. If fraud occurred throughout the polling period at a similar rate, it would have totaled about 19,000 fraudulent votes.